HS 08 Carnap Workshops: Chapuis, Wagner, Horsten
Delphine Chapuis und Pierre Wagner
Die Carnap-Lesegruppe lädt ein zum Workshop mit Delphine Chapuis und Pierre Wagner (Paris) am 5. November 08:
"Carnap's Reconstruction"
Ort: A 019, Uni-S, Schanzeneckstrasse 1
Zeit: 10.00-13.00 & 15.00-18.00
Delphine Chapuis-Schmitz: 'The Aims and Relevance of Rational Reconstruction: A Discussion of Carnap's Program'
This paper aims at discussing and assessing the relevance of rational reconstruction as a method for philosophy as it has been proponed by Carnap. One of the tenets of Carnap's conception of the role of philosophy can be formulated as follows: the task of the philosopher is to construct language systems by setting up definite sets of linguistic rules. This approach to philosophy, often labeled "rational reconstruction", is associated with a constructivist view on language, and it has been widely criticized by proponents of various forms of naturalism. My discussion will focus on Quine's and Strawson's criticisms successively. Whereas the first contrasts rational reconstruction with naturalized epistemology, the second contrasts it with natural language analysis; and each of them asserts that rational reconstruction is irrelevant in the face of the competing method he suggests for philosophy. Against these criticisms, I will examine the arguments which can be brought in defense of the carnapian position, whereby it will be shown (1) that Quine's criticism arises from the unquestioned acceptance of theses that Carnap considers are in need of explication, (2) that Strawson's criticism relies on a clear-cut divide between ordinary and formal languages which Carnap does not acknowledge. It will finally appear that explication is at the core of the carnapian philosophical enterprise.
Suggested reading:
Carnap (1963). "W.V. Quine on Logical Truth" and "P. F. Strawson on Linguistic Naturalism". In P.A. Schilpp (ed.): The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, p.915-923 and 933-940.
Strawson (1963). "Carnap's Views on Constructed Systems vs. Natural Languages in Analytic Philosophy". In P.A. Schilpp (ed.): The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, p.503-518.
Quine (1963). "Carnap on Logical Truth". In P.A. Schilpp (ed.): The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, p.385-406.
Quine (1969). "Epistemology Naturalized". In: Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, chap.3.
Pierre Wagner: 'Carnap's Critique of Philosophy and His Attempt at a Reconstruction'
Like other members of the Vienna Circle, Carnap criticized traditional philosophy for its lack of clarity and precision, as is well-know from such papers as "The elimination of metaphysics through the logical analysis of language" (1932) and many other writings. In 'The Logical Syntax of Language' (1934), while still entertaining the idea that, in some sense, metaphysics is nonsense, Carnap's critique of philosophy is based on different grounds and aimed at different authors. In this book, his critique of philosophy actually takes the form of an attempt at a reconstruction of philosophy on a new basis. I shall try to examine this attempt and to show why it fails. I shall also try to show how Carnap's thought evolved on this point in later writings, in particular in "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" (1950).
Suggested reading:
Carnap (1932). "Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache".
Carnap (1934). The Logical Syntax of Language, § 46, §§ 62-64.
Carnap (1950) "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology", in: Carnap: Meaning and Necessity, Supplement A.
Leon Horsten
Die Carnap-Lesegruppe lädt ein zum Workshop mit Leon Horsten (Bristol) am 15. Dezember 2008:
"Carnap on Modality, Quantification and Descriptions"
Ort: A 019, Uni-S, Schanzeneckstrasse 1
Zeit: 10.00-13.00 & 15.00-18.00
Das Programm umfasst folgende Punkte:
- Quine’s argument against quantified modal logic (QML)
- The Russellian response to Quine’s argument
- Carnap’s system of quantified modal logic with identity (QMLI)
- Collapse arguments for Carnap’s system
- Ways out?
Diskussionsgrundlage ist Leon Horstens Paper: On description terms.
Weitere Lektüre:
1. Quine, W.V.O. Notes on existence and necessity. Journal of Philosophy, 1943.
2. Russell, B. On denoting. Mind 14 (1905), p. 479-493.
3. Carnap, R. Meaning and Necessity, Second edition, University of Chicago Press, 1956, Chapter I (§§1-7, §§8-16) and Chapter V.
4. Kripke, S. Individual concepts: their logic, philosophy, and some of their uses. Proceedings and Addresses of the APA 66(1992), p. 70-73.
5. Marti, G. Do modal distinctions collapse in Carnap's system? Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (1994), p. 575-593.
6. Kremer, M. Marti on descriptions in Carnap's S2. Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (1997), p. 629-634.
Bilder vom Workshop
Die Workshops werden unterstützt durch den Nachwuchsförderungs-Projektpool der MVUB.