

previous section of this 'Reply' about philosophical psychology and rationality, and that general questions about value, including metaphysical questions, were the topic of my 1983 Carus lectures. So perhaps I shall be pardoned if here I concentrate primarily on metaphysics. I fear that, even when I am allowed the advantage of operating within these limitations, what I have to say will be programmatic and speculative rather than well ordered and well argued.

At the outset of their comments on my views concerning metaphysics, Richards say, 'Grice's ontological views are at least liberal'; and they document this assertion by a quotation from my *Method in Philosophical Psychology*, in which I admit to a 'taste for keeping open house for all sorts and conditions of entities, just so long as when they come in they help with the housework'. I have no wish to challenge their representation of my expressed position, particularly as the cited passage includes a reference to the possibility that certain sorts of entities might, because of backing from some transcendental argument, qualify as *entia realissima*. The question I would like to raise is, rather, what grounds are there for accepting the current conception of the relationship between metaphysics and ontology? Why should it be assumed that metaphysics consists in, or even includes in its domain, the programme of arriving at an acceptable ontology? Is the answer merely that that enterprise is the one, or a part of the one, to which the term 'metaphysics' is conventionally applied, and so, that a justification of this application cannot be a philosophical issue?

If this demand for a *justified* characterization of metaphysics is to be met, I can think of only one likely strategy for meeting it. That will be to show that success within a certain sort of philosophical undertaking, which I will with striking originality call First Philosophy, is needed if any form of philosophy, or perhaps indeed any form of rational enquiry, is to be regarded as feasible or

legitimate; and that the contents of First Philosophy are identical with, or at least include, what are standardly regarded as the contents of metaphysics.² I can think of two routes by which this result might be achieved, which might well turn out not to be distinct from one another. One route would perhaps involve taking seriously the idea that if any region of enquiry is to be successful as a rational enterprise, its deliverance must be expressible in the shape of one or another of the possibly different types of theory; that characterizations of the nature and range of possible kinds of theory will be needed; and that such a body of characterization must itself be the outcome of rational enquiry, and so must itself exemplify whatever requirements it lays down for theories in general; it must itself be expressible as a theory, to be called (if you like) Theory-theory. The specification and justification of the ideas and material presupposed by any theory, whether such account falls within or outside the bounds of Theory-theory, would be properly called First Philosophy, and might turn out to relate to what is generally accepted as belonging to the subject-matter of metaphysics. It might, for example, turn out to be establishable that every theory has to relate to a certain range of subject items, has to attribute to them certain predicates or attributes, which in turn have to fall within one or another of the range of types or categories. In this way, the enquiry might lead to recognized metaphysical topics, such as the nature of being, its range of application, the nature of predication, and a systematic account of categories.

A second approach would focus not on the idea of the expressibility of the outcomes of rational enquiry in theories but rather on the question of what it is, in such enquiries, that we are looking for, why they are of concern to us. We start (so Aristotle has told us) as laymen with the awareness of a body of facts; what as theorists we

² In these reflections I have derived much benefit from discussions with Alan Code.

strive for is not (primarily) further facts, but *rational knowledge*, or *understanding*, of the facts we have, together with whatever further facts our investigations may provide for us. Metaphysics will have as its concern the nature and realizability of those items which are involved in any successful pursuit of understanding; its range will include the nature and varieties of explanation (as offered in some modification of the Doctrine of Four Causes), the acceptability of principles of logic, the proper standards of proof, and so on.

I have at this point three comments to make. First, should it be the case that (1) the foregoing approach to the conception of metaphysics is found acceptable, (2) the nature of explanation and (understood broadly) of causes is a metaphysical topic, and (3) that Aristotle is right (as I suspect he is) that the unity of the notion of *cause* is analogical in character, *then* the *general* idea of cause will rest on its standard particularizations, and the particular ideas cannot be reached as *specifications* of an antecedent genus, for there is no such genus. In that case, *final* causes will be (so to speak) foundation members of the *cause* family, and it will be dubious whether their title as causes can be disputed.

Second, it seems very likely that the two approaches are in fact *not* distinct; for it seems plausible to suppose that explanations, if fully rational, must be systematic and so must be expressible in theories. Conversely, it seems plausible to suppose that the function of theories is to explain, and so that whatever is susceptible to theoretical treatment is thereby explained.

Third, the most conspicuous difficulty about the approach which I have been tentatively espousing seems to me to be that we may be in danger of being given more than we want to receive; we are not, for example, ready to regard methods of proof or the acceptability of logical principles as metaphysical matters, and it is not clear how such things are to be excluded. But perhaps we are in

danger of falling victims to a confusion. Morality, as such, belongs to the province of ethics and does not belong to the province of metaphysics. But, as Kant saw (and I agree with him), that does not preclude there being metaphysical questions which arise about morality. In general, there may be a metaphysics of X without it being the case that X is a concept or item which belongs to metaphysics. Equally, there may be metaphysical questions relating to proof or logical principles without it being the case that, as such, proof or logical principles *belong* to metaphysics. It will be fair to add, however, that no distinction has yet been provided, within the class of items about which there are metaphysical questions, between those which do and those which do not belong to metaphysics.

The next element in my attitude towards metaphysics to which I would like to draw attention is my strong sympathy for a *constructivist* approach. The appeal of such an approach seems to me to lie essentially in the idea that if we operate with the aim of expanding some set of starting-points, by means of regulated and fairly well-defined procedures, into a constructed edifice of considerable complexity, we have better prospects of obtaining the explanatory richness which we need than if, for example, we endeavour to represent the seeming wealth of the world of being as reducible to some favoured range of elements. That is, of course, a rhetorical plea, but perhaps such pleas have their place.

But a constructivist methodology, if its title is taken seriously, plainly has its own difficulties. Construction, as normally understood, requires one or more constructors; so far as a metaphysical construction is concerned, who does the constructing? 'We'? But who are we, and do we operate separately or conjointly, or in some other way? And when and where are the acts of construction performed, and how often? These troublesome queries are reminiscent of differences which arose, I believe, among Kantian commentators, about whether Kant's threefold

synthesis (perhaps a close relative of construction) is (or was) a datable operation or not. I am not aware that they arrived at a satisfactory solution. The problem becomes even more acute when we remember that some of the best candidates for the title of constructed entities, for example numbers, are supposed to be eternal, or at least timeless. How could such entities have construction dates?

Some relief may perhaps be provided if we turn our eyes towards the authors of fiction. My next novel will have as its hero one Caspar Winebibber, a notorious English highwayman born (or so I shall say) in 1764 and hanged in 1798, thereby ceasing to exist long before sometime next year, when I create (or construct) him. This mind-boggling situation will be dissolved if we distinguish between two different occurrences; first, Caspar's birth (or death), which is dated to 1764 (or 1798), and second, my creation of Caspar, that is to say, my making it in 1985 fictionally true that Caspar was born in 1764 and died in 1798. Applying this stratagem to metaphysics, we may perhaps find it tolerable to suppose that a particular great mathematician should in 1968 make it true that (let us say) ultralunary numbers should exist timelessly or from and to eternity. We might even, should we so wish, introduce a 'depersonalized' (and 'detemporized') notion of construction; in which case we can say that in 1968 the great mathematician, by authenticated construction, not only constructed the timeless existence of ultralunary numbers but also the thereby depersonalized and detemporized construction of the timeless existence of ultralunary numbers, and also the depersonalized construction of the depersonalized construction of . . . ultralunary numbers. In this way, we might be able, in one fell swoop, to safeguard the copyrights both of the mathematician and eternity.

Another extremely important aspect of my conception of metaphysical construction (creative metaphysical thinking) is that it is of its nature revisionary or gradualist in character. It is not just that, since metaphysics is a very

difficult subject, the best way to proceed is to observe the success and failures of others and to try to build further advance upon their achievements. It is rather that there is no other way of proceeding but the way of gradualism. A particular bit of metaphysical construction is possible only on the basis of some prior material; which must itself either be the outcome of prior constructions, or perhaps be something original and unconstructed. As I see it, gradualism enters in in more than one place. One point of entry relates to the degree of expertise of the theorist or investigator. In my view, it is incumbent upon those whom Aristotle would have called 'the wise' in metaphysics, as often elsewhere, to treat with respect and build upon the opinions and the practices of 'the many'; and any intellectual indignation at the idea of professionals being hamstrung by amateurs will perhaps be seen as inappropriate when it is reflected that the amateurs are really (since personal identities may be regarded as irrelevant) only ourselves (the professionals) at an earlier stage; there are not two parties, like Whigs and Tories, or nobles and the common people, but rather one family of speakers pursuing the life of reason at different stages of development; and the later stages of development depend upon the earlier ones.

Gradualism also comes into play with respect to theory development. A characteristic aspect of what I think of as a constructivist approach towards theory development involves the appearance of what I call 'overlaps'. It may be that a theory or theory-stage *B*, which is to be an extension of theory or theory-stage *A*, includes as part of itself linguistic or conceptual apparatus which provides us with a restatement of all or part of theory *A*, as one segment of the arithmetic of positive and negative integers provides us with a restatement of the arithmetic of natural numbers. But while such an overlap may be needed to secure intelligibility for theory *B*, theory *B* would be pointless unless its expressive power transcended that of theory *A*,

unless (that is to say) a further segment of theory B lay beyond the overlap. Gradualism sometimes appears on the scene in relation to stages exhibited by some feature attaching to the theory as a whole, but more often perhaps in relation to stages exemplified in some department of, or some category within, the theory. We can think of metaphysics as involving a developing sequence of metaphysical schemes; we can also locate developmental features within and between particular metaphysical categories. Again, I regard such developmental features not as accidental but as essential to the prosecution of metaphysics. One can only reach a proper understanding of metaphysical concepts like *law* or *cause* if one sees, for example, the functional analogy, and so the developmental connection, between *natural* laws and *non-natural* laws (like those of legality or morality). 'How is such and such a range of uses of the word (the concept) *x* to be rationally generated?' is to my mind a type of question which we should continually be asking.

I may now revert to a question which appeared briefly on the scene a page or so ago. Are we, if we lend a sympathetic ear to constructivism, to think of the metaphysical world as divided into a constructed section and a primitive, original, unconstructed section? I will confess at once that I do not know the answer to this question. The forthright contention that if there is a realm of constructs there has to be also a realm of non-constructs to provide the material upon which the earliest ventures in construction are to operate has its appeal, and I have little doubt that I have been influenced by it. But I am by no means sure that it is correct. I am led to this uncertainty initially by the fact that when I ask myself what classes of entities I would be happy to regard as original and unconstructed, I do not very readily come up with an answer. Certainly not common objects like tables and chairs; but would I feel better about stuffs like rock or hydrogen, or bits thereof? I do not know, but I am not moved towards any emphatic

'yes!' Part of my trouble is that there does not seem to me to be any good logical reason calling for a class of ultimate non-constructs. It seems to me quite on the cards that metaphysical theory, at least when it is formally set out, might consist in a package of what I will call ontological schemes in which categories of entities are constructively ordered, that all or most of the same categories may appear within two different schemes with different ordering, what is primitive in one scheme being non-primitive in the other, and that this might occur whether the ordering relations employed in the construction of the two schemes were the same or different. We would then have no role for a notion of *absolute* primitiveness. All we would use would be the relative notion of primitiveness-with-respect-to-a-scheme. There might indeed be room for a concept of authentic or maximal reality; but the application of this concept would be divorced from any concept of primitiveness, relative or absolute, and would be governed by the availability of an argument, no doubt transcendental in character, showing that a given category is mandatory, that a place must be found for it in *any* admissible ontological scheme. I know of no grounds for rejecting ideas along these lines.

The complexities introduced by the possibility that there is no original, unconstructed, area of reality, together with a memory of the delicacy of treatment called for by the last of the objections to my view on the philosophy of language, suggest that debates about the foundations of metaphysics are likely to be peppered with allegations of circularity; and I suspect that this would be the view of any thoughtful student of metaphysics who gave serious attention to the methodology of his discipline. Where are the first principles of First Philosophy to come from, if not from the operation, practised by the emblematic pelican, of lacerating its own breast. In the light of these considerations it seems to me to be of the utmost importance to get clear about the nature and forms of real or apparent

circularity, and to distinguish those forms, if any, which are innocuous from those which are deadly. To this end I would look for a list, which might not be all that different from the list provided by Aristotle, of different kinds, or interpretations, of the idea of *priority*, with a view to deciding when the supposition that *A* is prior to *B* allows or disallows the possibility that *B* may also be prior to *A*, either in the same, or in some other, dimension of priority. Relevant kinds of priority would perhaps include logical priority, definitional or conceptual priority, epistemic priority, and priority in respect of value. I will select two examples, both possibly of philosophical interest, where for differing *m* and *n*, it might be legitimate to suppose that the priority_{*m*} of *A* to *B* would not be a barrier to the priority_{*n*} of *B* to *A*. It seems to me not implausible to hold that in respect of one or another version of *conceptual* priority, the legal concept of *right* is prior to the moral concept of *right*: the moral concept is only understandable by reference to, and perhaps is even explicitly definable in terms of, the legal concept. But if that is so, we are perhaps not debarred from regarding the moral concept as valuationally prior to the legal concept; the range of application of the legal concept *ought to be* always determined by criteria which are couched in terms of the moral concept. Again, it might be important to distinguish two kinds of *conceptual* priority, which might both apply to one and the same pair of items, though in different directions. It might be, perhaps, that the properties of sense-data, like colours (and so sense-data themselves), are posterior in one sense to corresponding properties of material things (and so to material things themselves); properties of material things, perhaps, render the properties of sense-data intelligible by providing a paradigm for them. But when it comes to the provision of a suitably motivated *theory* of material things and their properties, the idea of making these *definitionally* explicable in terms of sense-data and their properties may not be ruled out by the

holding of the aforementioned conceptual priority in the reverse direction. It is perhaps reasonable to regard such fine distinction as indispensable if we are to succeed in the business of pulling ourselves up by our own bootstraps. In this connection it will be relevant for me to reveal that I once invented (though I did not establish its validity) a principle which I labelled as *Bootstrap*. The principle laid down that when one is introducing the primitive concepts of a theory formulated in an object language, one has freedom to use any battery of concepts expressible in the meta-language, subject to the condition that counterparts of such concepts are subsequently definable or otherwise derivable in the object-language. So the more economically one introduces the primitive object-language concepts, the less of a task one leaves oneself for the morrow.

I must now turn to a more direct consideration of the question of how metaphysical principles are ultimately to be established. A prime candidate is forthcoming, namely, a special metaphysical type of argument, one that has been called by Kant and by various other philosophers since Kant a *transcendental argument*. Unfortunately it is by no means clear to me precisely what Kant, and still less what some other philosophers, regard as the essential character of such an argument. Some, I suspect, have thought of a transcendental argument in favour of some thesis or category of items as being one which claims that if we reject the thesis or category in question, we shall have to give up something which we very much want to keep; and the practice of some philosophers, including Kant, of hooking transcendental argument to the possibility of some very central notion, such as experience or knowledge, or (the existence of) *language*, perhaps lends some colour to this approach. My view (and my view of Kant) takes a different tack. One thing which seems to be left out in the treatments of transcendental argument just mentioned is the idea that transcendental argument involves the suggestion that something is being *undermined* by one who is

sceptical about the conclusion which such an argument aims at establishing. Another thing which is left out is any investigation of the notion of *rationality*, or the notion of a rational being. Precisely what remedy I should propose for these omissions is far from clear to me; I have to confess that my ideas in this region of the subject are still in a very rudimentary state. But I will do the best I can.

I suspect that there is no single characterization of transcendental arguments which will accommodate all of the traditionally recognized specimens of the kind; indeed, there seem to me to be at least three sorts of argument-pattern with good claims to be dignified with the title of 'transcendental'.

1. One pattern fits Descartes's *cogito* argument, which Kant himself seems to have regarded as paradigmatic. This argument may be represented as pointing to a thesis, namely his own existence, to which a real or pretended sceptic is thought of as expressing enmity, in the form of doubt; and it seeks to show that the sceptic's procedure is self-destructive in that there is an irresolvable conflict between, on the one hand, *what* the sceptic is suggesting (that he does not exist), and on the other hand the possession, by his act of suggesting, of the illocutionary character (being the expression of a doubt) which it not only has but must, on the account, be supposed by the sceptic to have. It might, in this case, be legitimate to go on to say that the expression of doubt cannot be denied application, since without the capacity for the expression of doubt the exercise of rationality will be impossible; but while this addition might link this pattern with the two following patterns, it does not seem to add anything to the cogency of the argument.

2. Another pattern of argument would be designed for use against applications of what I might call 'epistemological nominalism'; that is, against someone who proposes to admit *ys* but not *xs* on the grounds that epistemic justification is available for *ys* but not for anything like *xs*,

which supposedly go beyond *ys*; we can, for example, allow sense-data but not material objects, if they are thought of as 'over and above' sense-data; we can allow particular events but not, except on some minimal interpretation, causal connections between events. The pattern of argument under consideration would attempt to show that the sceptic's at first sight attractive caution is a false economy; that the rejection of the 'over-and-above' entities is epistemically destructive of the entities with which the sceptic deems himself secure; if material objects or causes go, sense-data and datable events go too. In some cases it might be possible to claim, on the basis of the lines of the third pattern of argument, that not just the minimal categories, but, in general, the possibility of the exercise of rationality will have to go.

3. A third pattern of argument might contend from the outset that if such and such a target of the sceptic were allowed to fall, then something else would have to fall which is a pre-condition of the exercise of rationality; it might be argued, for example, that some sceptical thesis would undermine freedom, which in turn is a pre-condition of any exercise of rationality whatsoever.

It is plain that arguments of this third type might differ from one another in respect of the particular pre-condition of rationality which they brandish in the face of a possible sceptic. But it is possible that they might differ in a more subtle respect. Some less ambitious arguments might threaten a *local* breakdown of rationality, a breakdown in some particular area. An argument might hold, for instance, that certain sceptical positions would preclude the possibility of the exercise of rationality in the practical domain. While such arguments may be expected to carry weight with some philosophers, a really doughty sceptic is liable to accept the threatened curtailment of rationality; he may, as Hume and those who follow him have done, accept the virtual exclusion of reason from the area of action. The threat, however, may be of a *total* breakdown

of the possibility of the exercise of rationality; and here even the doughty sceptic might quail, on pain of losing his audience if he refuses to quail.

A very important feature of these varieties of transcendental argument (though I would prefer to abandon the term 'transcendental' and just call them *metaphysical arguments*) may be their connection with practical argument. In a broadened sense of 'practical', which would relate not just to action but also to the adoption of any attitude or stance which is within our rational control, we might think of all argument, even alethic argument, as practical, perhaps with the practical tailpiece omitted; alethic or evidential argument may be thought of as directing us to accept or believe some proposition on the grounds that it is certain or likely to be true. But sometimes we are led to *rational* acceptance of a proposition (though perhaps not to *belief* in it) by considerations other than the likelihood of its truth. Things that are matters of *faith* of one sort or another, like the fidelity of one's wife or the justice of one's country's cause, are typically not accepted on evidential grounds but as demands imposed by loyalty or patriotism; and the arguments produced by those who wish us to have such faith may well not be silent about this fact. Metaphysical argument and acceptance may exhibit a partial analogy with these examples of the acceptance of something as a matter of faith. In the metaphysical region, too, the practical aspect may come first: we must accept such and such a thesis or else face an intolerable breakdown of rationality. But in the case of metaphysical argument, the threatened calamity is such that the acceptance of the thesis which avoids it is invested with the alethic trappings of truth and evidential respectability. Proof of the pudding comes from the need to eat it, not vice versa. These thoughts will perhaps allay a discomfort which some people, including myself, have felt with respect to transcendental arguments. It has seemed to me in at least some cases, that the most that such arguments

could hope to show is that rationality demands the *acceptance*, not the *truth*, of this or that thesis. This feature would not be a defect if one can go on to say that *this* kind of demand for acceptance is sufficient to confer truth on what is to be accepted.

It is now time for me to turn to a consideration of the ways in which metaphysical construction is effected, and I shall attempt to sketch three of these. But before I do so, I should like to make one or two general remarks about such construction routines. It is pretty obvious that metaphysical construction needs to be disciplined, but this is not because without discipline it will be badly done, but because without discipline it will not be done at all. The list of available routines determines what metaphysical construction *is*; so it is no accident that it employs these routines. This reflection may help us to solve what has appeared to me, and to others, as a difficult problem in the methodology of metaphysics, namely, how are we to distinguish metaphysical construction from scientific construction of such entities as electrons or quarks? What is the difference between hypostasis and hypothesis? The answer may lie in the idea that in metaphysical construction, including hypostasis, we reach new entities (or in some cases, perhaps, suppose them to be reachable) by application of the routines which are essential to metaphysical construction; when we are scientists and hypothesize, we do not rely on these routines, at least in the first instance; if at a later stage we shift our ground, that is a major theoretical change.

I shall first introduce two of these construction routines; before I introduce the third I shall need to bring in some further material, which will also be relevant to my task in other ways. The first routine is one which I have discussed elsewhere, and which I call *Humean Projection*. Something very like it is indeed described by Hume, when he talks about the mind's propensity to spread itself on objects; but he seems to regard it as a source, or a product, of

confusion and illusion which, perhaps, our nature renders unavoidable, rather than as an achievement of reason. In my version of the routine, one can distinguish four real or apparent stages, the first of which, perhaps, is not always present. At this first stage we have some initial concept, like that expressed by the word 'or' or 'not', or (to take a concept relevant to my present undertakings) the concept of value. We can think of these initial items as, at this stage, intuitive and unclarified elements in our conceptual vocabulary. At the second stage we reach a specific mental state, in the specification of which it is possible, though maybe not necessary, to use the name of the initial concept as an adverbial modifier: we come to 'or-thinking' (or disjoining), 'not-thinking' (or rejecting, or denying), and 'value-thinking' (or valuing, or approving). These specific states may be thought of as bound up with, and indeed as generating, some set of responses to the appearance on the scene of instantiation of the initial concepts. At the third stage, reference to these specific states is replaced by a general (or more general) psychological verb together with an operator corresponding to the particular specific stage which appears within the scope of the general verb, but is still only allowed maximal scope within the complement of the verb and cannot appear in subclauses. So we find reference to 'thinking *p* or *q*' or 'thinking it valuable to learn Greek'. At the fourth and last stage, the restriction imposed by the demand that the operators at the third stage should be scope-dominant within the complement of the accompanying verb is removed; there is no limitation on the appearance of the operation in subordinate clauses.

With regard to this routine I would make five observations:

1. The employment of this routine may be expected to deliver for us, as its end-result, *concepts* (in something like a Fregean sense of the word) rather than *objects*. To generate objects we must look to other routines.
2. The provision, at the fourth stage, of full syntactico-

semantical freedom for the operators which correspond to the initial concepts is possible only via the provision of truth conditions, or of some different but analogous valuations, for statements within which the operators appear. Only thus can the permissible complexities be made intelligible.

3. Because of observation 2, the difference between the second and third stages is apparent rather than real. The third stage provides only a notational variant of the second stage, at least unless the fourth stage is also reached.

4. It is important to recognize that the development, in a given case, of the routine must not be merely formal or arbitrary. The invocation of a subsequent stage must be exhibited as having some point or purpose, as (for example) enabling us to account for something which needs to be accounted for.

5. Subject to these provisos, application of this routine to our initial concept ('putting it through the mangle') does furnish one with a metaphysical reconstruction of that concept; or, if the first stage is missing, we are given a metaphysical construction of a new concept.

The second construction routine harks back to Aristotle's treatment of predication and categories, and I will present my version of it as briefly as I can. Perhaps its most proper title would be *Category Shift*; but since I think of it as primarily useful for introducing new objects, new subjects of discourse, by a procedure reminiscent of the linguists' operation of nominalization, I might also refer to it as *subjectification* (or, for that matter, *objectification*). Given a class of primary subjects of discourse, namely substances, there are a number of 'slots' (categories) into which predicates of these primary subjects may fit; one is substance itself (secondary substance), in which case the predication is intra-categorical and *essential*; and there are others into which the predicates assigned in non-essential or accidental predication may fall: the list of these would resemble Aristotle's list of quality, quantity, and so forth.

It might be, however, that the members of my list, perhaps unlike that of Aristotle, would not be fully co-ordinate; the development of the list might require not one blow but a succession of blows; we might, for example, have to develop first the category of attribute, and then the subordinate categories of quantitative attribute (quantity) and non-quantitative attribute (quality), or again the category of event before the subordinate category of action.

Now though substances are to be the *primary* subjects of predication, they will not be the only subjects. Derivatives of, or conversions of, items which start life (so to speak) as predicables, in one non-substantial slot or another, of substances may themselves come to occupy the first slot; they will be qualities of, or quantities of, a particular type or token of substantials: not being qualities or quantities of substances, they will not be qualities or quantities *simpliciter*. (It is my suspicion that only for substances, as subjects, are *all* the slots filled by predicable items.) Some of these substantials which are not substances may derive from a plurality of items from different original categories; events, for example, might be complex substantials deriving from a substance, an attribute, and a time.

My position with regard to the second routine runs parallel to my position with regard to the first, in that here too I hold strongly to the opinion that the introduction of a new category of entities must not be arbitrary. It has to be properly motivated; if it is not, perhaps it fails to be a case of entry-construction altogether, and becomes merely a *way of speaking*. What sort of motivation is called for is not immediately clear. One strong candidate would be the possibility of opening up new applications for existing modes of explanation; it may be, for example, that the substantial introduction of abstract entities, like properties, makes possible the application to what Kneale called 'secondary induction',³ the principles at work in *primary*

³ William Kneale, *Probability and Induction* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), 104, for example.

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induction. But it is not only the sort but the *degree* of motivation which is in question. When I discussed metaphysical argument, it seemed that to achieve reality the acceptance of a category of entities had to be *mandatory*; whereas the recent discussion has suggested that apart from conformity to construction routines, all that is required is that the acceptance be *well motivated*. Which view would be correct? Or is it that we can tolerate a division of constructed reality into two segments, with admission requirements of differing degrees of stringency? Or is there just one sort of admission requirement, which in some cases is over-fulfilled?

Before characterizing my third construction routine I must say a brief word about *essential properties* and about *finality*, two Aristotelian ideas which at least until recently have been pretty unpopular, but for which I want to find metaphysical room. In their logical dress, essential properties would appear either as properties which are constitutive or definitive of a given, usually substantial, kind; or as individuating properties of individual members of a kind, properties such that if an individual were to lose them, it would lose its identity, its existence, and indeed itself. It is clear that if a property is one of the properties which define a kind, it is also an individuating property of individual members of a kind, properties such that if an individual were to lose them, it would cease to belong to the kind and so cease to exist. (A more cautious formulation would be required if, as the third construction routine might require, we subscribed to the Grice-Myro view of identity.) Whether the converse holds seems to depend on whether we regard spatio-temporal continuity as a definitive property for substantial kinds, indeed for *all* substantial kinds.

But there is another, more metaphysical dress which essential properties may wear. They may appear as Keynesian generator-properties, 'core' properties of a substantive kind which co-operate to explain the phenomenal and dispositional features of members of that kind.

On the face of it this is a quite different approach; but on reflection I find myself wondering whether the difference is as large as it might at first appear. Perhaps at least at the level of a type of theorizing which is not too sophisticated and mathematicized, as maybe these days the physical sciences are, the logically essential properties and the fundamentally explanatory properties of a substantial kind come together; substances are essentially (in the 'logical sense') things such that in circumstances *C* they manifest feature *F*, where the gap-signs are replaced in such a way as to display the most basic laws of the theory. So perhaps, at this level of theory, substances require theories to give expression to their nature, and theories require substances to govern them.

Finality, particularly *detached* finality (functions or purposes which do not require sanction from purposers or users), is an even more despised notion than that of an essential property, especially if it is supposed to be explanatory, to provide us with *final causes*. I am somewhat puzzled by this contempt for detached finality, as if it were an unwanted residue of an officially obsolete complex of superstitions and priestcraft. That, in my view, it is certainly not: the concepts and vocabulary of finality, operating as if they were detached, are part and parcel of our standard procedures for recognizing and describing what goes on around us. This point is forcibly illustrated by William Golding in *The Inheritors*.⁴ There he describes, as seen through the eyes of a stone-age couple who do not understand at all what they are seeing, a scene in which (I am told) their child is cooked and eaten by iron-age people. In the description functional terms are eschewed, with the result that the incomprehension of the stone-age couple is vividly shared by the reader. Now finality is sometimes active rather than passive: the finality of a thing then consists in what it is supposed to *do* rather than in

what it is supposed to suffer, have done to it, or have done with it. Sometimes the finality of a thing is not dependent on some ulterior end which the thing is envisaged as realizing. Sometimes the finality of a thing is not imposed or dictated by a will or interest extraneous to the thing. And sometimes the finality of a thing is not subordinate to the finality of some whole of which the thing is a component, as the finality of an eye or a foot *may* be subordinate to the finality of the organism to which it belongs. When the finality of a thing satisfies all of these overlapping conditions and exclusions, I shall call it a case of *autonomous* finality; and I shall also on occasion call it a *métier*. I will here remark that we should be careful to distinguish this kind of autonomous finality, which may attach to substances, from another kind of finality which seemingly will not be autonomous, and which will attach to the *conception* of kinds of substance or of other constructed entities. The latter sort of finality will represent the point or purpose, from the point of view of the metaphysical theorist, of bringing into play, in a particular case, a certain sort of metaphysical manoeuvre. It is this latter kind of finality which I have been supposing to be a requirement for the legitimate deployment of construction routines.

Now it is my position that what I might call finality features, at least if they consist in the possession of *autonomous* finality, may find a place within the essential properties of at least some kinds of substances (for example, persons). Some substances may be essentially 'for doing such and such'. Indeed, I suspect we might go further than this, and suppose that autonomous finality not merely *can* fall within a substance's essential nature, but indeed, if it attaches to a substance at all, *must* belong to its essential nature. If a substance has a certain *métier*, it does not have to seek the fulfilment of that *métier*, but it does have to be equipped with the motivation to fulfil the *métier* should it choose to follow that motivation. And

⁴ [London: Faber & Faber, 1955.]

since autonomous finality is independent of any ulterior end, that motivation must consist in respect for the idea that to fulfil the *métier* would be in line with its own essential nature. But however that may be, once we have finality features enrolled among the essential properties of a kind of substance, we have a starting-point for the generation of a theory or system of conduct for that kind of substance, which would be analogous to the descriptive theory which can be developed on the basis of a substance's essential descriptive properties.

I can now give a brief characterization of my third construction routine, which is called *Metaphysical Transubstantiation*. Let us suppose that the genitor has sanctioned the appearance of a biological type called *humans*, into which, considerate as always, he has built an attribute, or complex of attributes, called *rationality*, perhaps on the grounds that this would greatly assist its possessors in coping speedily and resourcefully with survival problems posed by a wide range of environments, which they would thus be in a position to enter and to maintain themselves in. But, perhaps unwittingly, he will thereby have created a breed of potential metaphysicians; and what they do is (so to speak) to reconstitute themselves. They do not alter the totality of attributes which each of them as a human possesses, but they redistribute them; properties which they possess essentially as humans become properties which as substances of a new psychological type called *persons* they possess accidentally, and the property or properties called *rationality*, which attaches only accidentally to humans, attaches essentially to persons. While each human is standardly coincident with a particular person (and is indeed, perhaps, identical with that person over a time), logic is insufficient to guarantee that there will not come a time when that human and that person are no longer identical, when *one* of them, perhaps, but not the other, has ceased to exist. But though logic is insufficient, it may

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be that other theories will remedy the deficiency. Why, otherwise than from a taste for mischief, the humans (or persons) should have wanted to bring off this feat of transubstantiation will have to be left open until my final section, which I have now reached.

My final undertaking will be an attempt to sketch a way of providing metaphysical backing, drawn from the material which I have been presenting, for a reasonably unimpooverished theory of value; I shall endeavour to produce an account which is fairly well ordered, even though it may at the same time be one which bristles with unsolved problems and unformulated supporting arguments. What I have to offer will be close to and I hope compatible with, though certainly not precisely the same as, the content of my third Carus lecture.⁵ Though it lends an ear to several other voices from our philosophical heritage, it may be thought of as being, in the main, a representation of the position of that unjustly neglected philosopher Kantotle. It involves six stages.

1. The details of the logic of value concepts and of their possible relativizations are unfortunately visible only through thick intellectual smog; so I shall have to help myself to what, at the moment at least, I regard as two distinct dichotomies. First, there is a dichotomy between value concepts which are *relativized* to some focus of relativization and those which are not so relativized, which are *absolute*. If we address ourselves to the concept *being of value* there are perhaps two possible primary foci of relativization; that of *end* or potential end, that *for* which something may be of value, as bicarbonate of soda may be of value for health (or my taking it of value for my health), or 'dumb-bells' may be of value (useful) for bulging the biceps; and that of *beneficiary* or potential beneficiary, the person (or other sort of item) to whom (or to which)

⁵ [Original Version, 1983; see pp. 69-91 above.]

something may be of value, as the possession of a typewriter is of value to some philosophers but not to me, since I do not type. With regard to this dichotomy I am inclined to accept the following principles. First, the presence in me of a concern for the focus of relativization is what is needed to give the value concept a 'bite' on me, that is to say, to ensure that the application of the value concept to me does, or should, carry weight for me; only if I care for my aunt can I be expected to care about what is of value to her, such as her house and garden. Second, the fact that a relativized value-concept, through a *de facto* or *de jure* concern on my part for the focus of relativization, engages me does not imply that the original relativization has been cancelled, or rendered absolute. If my concern for your health stimulates in me a vivid awareness of the value to you of your medication, or the incumbency upon you to take your daily doses, that value and that incumbency are still relativized to *your health*; without a concern on *your* part for your health, such claims will leave you cold.

The second dichotomy, which should be carefully distinguished from the first, lies between those cases in which a value concept, which may be either relativized or absolute, attaches *originally*, or *directly*, to a given bearer, and those in which the attachment is *indirect* and is the outcome of the presence of a *transmitting* relation which links the current bearer with an original bearer, with or without the aid of an intervening sequence of 'descendants'. In the case of the transmission of relativized value-concepts, the transmitting relation may be the same as, or may be different from, the relation which is embodied in the relativization. The foregoing characterization would allow absolute value to attach originally or directly to promise-keeping or to my keeping a promise, and to attach indirectly or by transmission to my digging your garden for you, should that be something which I have promised to do; it would also allow the relativized value-concept of

value for health to attach directly to medical care and indirectly or by transmission to the payment of doctor's bills, an example in which the transmitting relation and the relativizing relation are one and the same.

2. The second stage of this metaphysical defence of the authenticity of the conception of value will involve a concession and a contention. It will be conceded that if the only conception of value available to us were that of *relativized* value then the notion of finality would be in a certain sense dispensable; and further, that if the notion of finality is denied authenticity, so must the notion of value be denied authenticity. A certain region of ostensible finality, which is sufficient to provide for the admissibility of attributions of relativized value, is "mechanistically substitutable"; that is to say, by means of reliance on the resources of cybernetics and on the fact that the non-pursuit of certain goals such as survival and reproduction is apt to bring to an end the supply of potential pursuers, some ostensibly final explanations are replaceable by, or reinterpretable as, explanations of a sort congenial to mechanists. But if the concept of value is to be authentic and not merely 'Pickwickian' in character, then it is required that it be supported by a kind of finality which extends beyond the 'overlap' with mechanistically substitutable finality; autonomous finality will be demanded, and a mechanist cannot accommodate and must deny this kind of finality; and so, as will shortly be indicated, he is committed to a denial of absolute value.

3. That metaphysical house-room be found for the notion of absolute value is a *rational demand*. To say this is not directly to offer reason to believe in the acceptability of the notion, though it makes a move in that direction. It is rather to say that there is good reason for *wanting* it to be true that the notion is acceptable. There might be more than one kind of rational ground for this desire. It might be that we feel a need to appeal to absolute value in order to justify some of our beliefs and attributes with regard to

relativized value, to maintain (for example) that it is of absolute value that everyone should pursue, within certain limits, what he regards as being of value to himself. Or again, it might be that, by Leibnizian standards for evaluating possible worlds, a world which contains absolute value, on the assumption that its regulation requires relatively simple principles, is richer and so better than one which does not.

But granted that there is a rational demand for absolute value, one can then perhaps argue that within whatever limits are imposed by metaphysical constructions already made, we are free to rig our metaphysics in such a way as to legitimize the conception of absolute value; what it is proper to believe to be true may depend in part on what one would like to be true. Perhaps part of the Kantian notion of positive freedom, a dignity which as rational beings we enjoy, is the freedom not merely to play the metaphysical game but, within the limits of rationality, to fix its rules as well. In any case, a trouble-free metaphysical story which will safeguard the credentials of absolute value is to be accepted should it be possible to devise one. I have some hopes that the methodology at work here might link up with my earlier ideas about the quasi-practical character of metaphysical argument.

4. On the assumption that the operation of Metaphysical Transubstantiation has been appropriately carried through, a class of biological creatures has been 'invented' into a class of psychological substances, namely persons, who possess as part of their essential nature a certain *métier* or autonomous finality consisting in the exercise, or a certain sort of exercise, of rationality, and who have only to recognize and respect a certain law of their nature, in order to display in favourable circumstances the capacity to realize their *métier*. The degree to which they fulfil that *métier* will constitute them *good persons* ('good *qua* persons'); and while the reference to the substantial kind persons undoubtedly introduces a restriction or qualifica-

tion, it is not clear (if it matters) that this restriction is a mode of relativization.

5. Once the concept of *value-qua-member-of-a-kind* has been set up for a class of substances, the way is opened for the appearance of transmitting relationships which will extend the application of value-in-a-kind to suitably qualified non-substantial aspects of members of a kind, such as actions and characteristics. While it cannot be assumed that persons will be the only original instances of value-in-a-kind, it seems plausible to suggest that whatever other original instances there may be will be far less fruitful sources of such extension, particularly if a prime mode of extension will be by the operation of Humean Projection. It seems plausible to suppose that a specially fruitful way of extending the range of absolute value might be an application or adaptation of the routine of Humean Projection, whereby such value is accorded, in Aristotelian style, to whatever would seem to possess such value in the eyes of a duly accredited judge; and a duly accredited judge might be identifiable as a good person operating in conditions of freedom. Cats, adorable as they may be, will be less productive sources of such extension than persons.

6. In the light of these reflections, and on the assumption that to reach the goal of securing the admissibility of the concept of absolute value we need a class of primary examples of an unqualified version of that concept, it would appear to be a rational procedure to allot to persons as a substantial type not just absolute value *qua members of their kind*, but absolute value *tout court*, that is to say, unqualified absolute value. Such value could be attributed to the kind, in virtue of its potentialities, and to selected individual members of the kind, in virtue of their achievements.

Such a defence of absolute value is, of course, bristling with unsolved or incompletely solved problems. I do not find this thought daunting. If philosophy generated no new

problems it would be dead, because it would be finished; and if it recurrently regenerated the same old problems it would not be alive because it could never begin. So those who still look to philosophy for their bread-and-butter should pray that the supply of new problems never dries up.

Method In Philosophical Psychology

(From the Banal to the Bizarre)¹

Preamble

In what follows, I shall be presenting some of my ideas about how I want to approach philosophical psychology. My hope is, in effect, to sketch a whole system; this is quite an undertaking, and I hope that you will bear with me if in discharging it I occupy a little more of your time than is becoming in holders of my august office. While I am sure that you will be able to detect some affinities between my ideas and ideas to be found in recent philosophy, I propose to leave such comparisons to you. Though at certain points I have had my eye on recent discussions, the main influences on this part of my work have lain in the past, particularly in Aristotle, Hume, and Kant. I have the feeling that between them these philosophers have written a great deal of the story, though perhaps not always in the most legible of hands.

¹ Presidential Address delivered at the 49th Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association in San Diego, 28 March 1975. Earlier versions of this address were given in lectures at Princeton University in March 1972, and as a John Dewey lecture at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor in April 1974.