

tion, version B, will constitute a necessary and sufficient condition for  $U$ 's having meant that  $\ast_p$ .

## 6. Conclusion

I see some grounds for hoping that, by paying serious attention to the relation between nonnatural and natural meaning, one might be able not only to reach a simplified account of utterer's occasion-meaning but also to show that any human institution, the function of which is to provide artificial substitutes for natural signs, must embody, as its key-concept, a concept possessing approximately the features which I ascribe to the concept of utterer's occasion-meaning. But such an endeavor lies beyond the scope of this essay.

## 6

# Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning

This essay analyzes in greater detail members of the quartet of specific conceptions of meaning which were distinguished in the preceding essay, with the exception of Utterer's Occasion-Meaning which I have just been subjecting to exhaustive examination. The present essay will, however, provide indications of how the meaning of words may be connected with the meaning of speakers.

## A. Introductory Remarks

My aim in this essay is to throw light on the connection between (a) a notion of meaning which I want to regard as basic, namely the notion which is involved in saying of someone that by (when) doing such-and-such he meant that so-and-so (in what I have called a non-natural sense of the word "meant"), and (b) the notions of meaning involved in saying (i) that a given sentence means "so-and-so" (ii) that a given word or phrase means "so-and-so." What I have to say on these topics should be looked upon as an attempt to provide a sketch of what might, I hope, prove to be a viable theory, rather than as an attempt to provide any part of a finally acceptable theory. The account which I shall offer of the (for me) basic notion of meaning is one which I shall not here seek to defend; I should like its approximate correctness to be assumed, so that attention may be focused on its utility, if correct, in the explication of other and (I hope) derivative notions of meaning. This enterprise forms part of a wider program which I shall in a moment delineate, though its later stages lie beyond the limits which I have set for this essay.

The wider program arises out of a distinction which, for purposes which I need not here specify, I wish to make within the total signification of a remark: a distinction between what the speaker has said (in a certain favored, and maybe in some degree artificial, sense of "said"), and what he has *implicated* (e.g. implied, indicated, suggested), taking into account the fact that what he has implicated may be either conventionally implicated (implicated by virtue of the meaning of some word or phrase which he has used) or nonconventionally implicated (in which case the specification of the implicature falls outside the specification of the conventional meaning of the words used). The program is directed toward an explication of the favored sense of "say" and a clarification of its relation to the notion of conventional meaning.

There are six stages in the program.

(I) To distinguish between locutions of the form "U (utterer) meant that . . ." (locutions which specify what might be called "occasion-meaning") and locutions of the form "X (utterance-type) means . . ." In locutions of the first type, meaning is specified without the use of quotation marks, whereas in locutions of the second type the meaning of a sentence, word, or phrase is specified with the aid of quotation marks. This difference is semantically important.

(II) To attempt to provide a definiens for statements of occasion-meaning, or more precisely, to provide a definiens for "By (when) uttering x, U meant that \*p." Some explanatory comments are needed here.

(a) I use the term "utter" (together with "utterance") in an artificially wide sense, to cover any case of doing x or producing x by the performance of which U meant that so-and-so. The performance in question need not be a linguistic or even a conventionalized performance. A substitutory replacement of the dummy "x" will in some cases be a characterization of a deed, in others a characterization of a product (e.g. a sound).

(b) "\*" is a *dummy* mood-indicator, distinct from specific mood-indicators like "+" (indicative or assertive) or "!" (imperative). More precisely, one may think of the schema "Jones meant that \*p" as yielding a full English sentence after two transformational steps:

(i) Replace "\*" by a specific mood-indicator and replace "p" by an indicative sentence. One might thus get to

"Jones meant that + Smith will go home" or  
 "Jones meant that ! Smith will go home."

(ii) Replace the sequence following the word "that" by an appropriate clause in indirect speech (in accordance with rules specified in a linguistic theory). One might thus get to

"Jones meant that Smith will go home."

"Jones meant that Smith is to go home."

(III) To attempt to elucidate the notion of the conventional meaning of an utterance-type, or more precisely, to explicate sentences which make claims of the form "X (utterance-type) means \*p," or, in case X is a nonsentential utterance-type, claims of the form "X means . . .," where the locution is completed by a nonsentential expression. Again, some explanatory comments are required.

(a) It will be convenient to recognize that what I shall call statements of *timeless meaning* (statements of the type "X means . . .," in which the specification of meaning involves quotation marks) may be subdivided into (i) statements of timeless "idiolet-meaning," such as "For U (in U's idiolet) X means . . ." and (ii) statements of timeless "language meaning," such as "In L (language) X means . . ." It will be convenient to handle these separately, and in the order just given.

(b) The truth of a statement to the effect that "X means . . ." is of course not incompatible with the truth of a further statement to the effect that "X means . . ." when the two lacunae are quite differently completed. An utterance-type may have more than one conventional meaning, and any definiens which we offer must allow for this fact. "X means . . ." should be understood as "One of the meanings of X is . . ."

(IV) In view of the possibility of multiplicity in the timeless meaning of an utterance-type, we shall need to notice, and to provide an explication of, what I shall call the *applied timeless meaning* of an utterance-type. That is, we need a definiens for the schema "X (utterance-type) meant *here* . . .," a schema the specifications of which announce the correct reading of X for a given occasion of utterance.

*Comments.* (a) We must be careful to distinguish the applied timeless meaning of X (type) with respect to a particular token x (belonging to X) from the occasion-meaning of U's utterance of x. The following are not equivalent:

(i) "When U uttered it, the sentence 'Palmer gave Nicklaus quite a beating' meant 'Palmer vanquished Nicklaus with some ease'

(rather than, say, 'Palmer administered vigorous corporal punishment to Nicklaus')."

(ii) "When U uttered the sentence 'Palmer gave Nicklaus quite a beating,' U meant that Palmer vanquished Nicklaus with some ease." U might have been speaking ironically, in which case he would likely have meant that Nicklaus vanquished Palmer with some ease. In that case (ii) would clearly be false; but nevertheless (i) would still have been true.

(b) There is some temptation to take the view that the conjunction of

- (i) "By uttering X, U meant that \*p" and
- (ii) "When uttered by U, X meant '\*p'"

provides a definition for "In uttering X, U said that \*p." Indeed, if we give consideration only to utterance-types for which there are available adequate statements of timeless meaning that take the exemplary form "X meant '\*p'" (or, in the case of applied timeless meaning, the form "X meant here '\*p'"), it may even be possible to uphold the thesis that such a coincidence of occasion-meaning and applied timeless meaning is a necessary and sufficient condition for saying that \*p. But a little reflection should convince us of the need to recognize the existence of statements of timeless meaning which instantiate forms other than the cited exemplary form; there are, I think, at least some sentences whose timeless meaning is not adequately specifiable by a statement of the exemplary form. Consider the sentence "Bill is a philosopher and he is, therefore, brave" (S<sub>1</sub>). It would be appropriate, I think, to make a partial specification of the timeless meaning of S<sub>1</sub> by saying "Part of one meaning of S<sub>1</sub> is 'Bill is occupationally engaged in philosophical studies.'" One might, indeed, give a full specification of timeless meaning for S<sub>1</sub> by saying "One meaning of S<sub>1</sub> includes 'Bill is occupationally engaged in philosophical studies' and 'Bill is courageous' and 'That Bill is courageous follows from his being occupationally engaged in philosophical studies,' and that is all that is included." We might re-express this as "One meaning of S<sub>1</sub> comprises 'Bill is occupationally engaged (etc.); 'Bill is courageous,' and 'That Bill is courageous follows (etc.).'" It is preferable to specify the timeless meaning of S<sub>1</sub> in this way than to do so as follows: "One meaning of S<sub>1</sub> is 'Bill is occupationally engaged (etc.) and Bill is courageous and that Bill is courageous follows (etc.);'" for the latter formulation at least suggests that S<sub>1</sub> is synonymous with the conjunctive sentence quoted in the formulation, which does not seem to be the case.

Since it is true that *another* meaning of S<sub>1</sub> includes "Bill is addicted to general reflections about life" (in place of "Bill is occupationally engaged [etc.]", one could have occasion to say (truly), with respect to a given utterance by U of S<sub>1</sub>, "The meaning of S<sub>1</sub> here comprised 'Bill is occupationally engaged (etc.); 'Bill is courageous,' and 'That Bill is courageous follows (etc.);' or to say "The meaning of S<sub>1</sub> here included "That Bill is courageous follows (etc.)." It could also be true that when U uttered S<sub>1</sub> he meant (part of what he meant was) that that Bill is courageous follows (etc.).

Now I do not wish to allow that, in my favored sense of "say," one who utters S<sub>1</sub> will have said that Bill's being courageous follows from his being a philosopher, though he may well have said that Bill is a philosopher and that Bill is courageous. I would wish to maintain that the semantic function of the word 'therefore' is to enable a speaker to indicate, though not to say, that a certain consequence holds. *Mistakenly*, I would adopt the same position with regard to words like "but" and "moreover." My primary reason for opting for this particular sense of "say" is that I expect it to be of greater theoretical utility than some other sense of "say" would be. So I shall be committed to the view that applied timeless meaning and occasion-meaning may coincide, that is to say, it may be true both (i) that when U uttered X, the meaning of X included "\*p" and (ii) that part of what U meant when he uttered X was that \*p, and yet it may be false that U has said, among other things, that \*p. I would like to use the expression "conventionally meant that" in such a way that the fulfillment of the two conditions just mentioned, while insufficient for the truth of "U said that \*p" will be sufficient (and necessary) for the truth of "U conventionally meant that \*p."

(V) This distinction between what is said and what is conventionally meant creates the task of specifying the conditions in which what U conventionally meant by an utterance is also part of what U said. I have hopes of being able to discharge this task by trying:

(1) To specify conditions which will be satisfied only by a limited range of speech-acts, the members of which will thereby be stamped as specially central or fundamental.

(2) To stipulate that in uttering X, U will have said that \*p, if both (i) U has Y-ed that \*p, where Y-ing is a central speech-act, and (ii) X embodies some conventional device the meaning of which is such that its presence in X indicates that its utterer is Y-ing that \*p.

(3) To define, for each member Y of the range of central speech-acts, "U has Y-ed that \*p" in terms of occasion-meaning (meaning

that . . .) or in terms of some important elements involved in the already provided definition of occasion-meaning.

(VI) The fulfillment of the task just outlined will need to be supplemented by an account of the elements in the conventional meaning of an utterance which are *not* part of what has been said. This account, at least for an important subclass of such elements, might take the following shape:

(1) The problematic elements are linked with certain speech-acts which are exhibited as posterior to, and such that their performance is dependent upon, some member or disjunction of members of the central range; for example, the meaning of "moreover" would be linked with the speech-act of adding, the performance of which would require the performance of one or another of the central speech-acts.

(2) If Z-ing is such a noncentral speech-act, the dependence of Z-ing that \*p upon the performance of some central speech-act would have to be shown to be of a nature which justifies a reluctance to treat Z-ing that \*p as a case not merely of saying that \*p but also of saying that #p, or of saying that #\*p, where "#p" or "#\*p" is a representation of one or more sentential forms specifically associated with Z-ing (as "moreover" is specifically associated with the speech-act of adding).

(3) The notion of Z-ing that \*p (where Z-ing is noncentral) would be explicated in terms of the notion of *meaning that* (or in terms of some important elements in the definition of that notion).

## B. Treatment of Some of the Problems Raised

The problems which I shall consider in the remainder of this essay are those which are presented by Stages II-IV of the program.

*Stage II.* I shall offer, without arguing for it, a somewhat oversimplified account of the notion of occasion-meaning, which (as I said at the outset) I should like to be treated as if it were correct.

In my 1957 article on *Meaning* (Essay 14) I suggested, for the schema "U meant (nonnaturally) something by uttering x," a three-clause definiens which may be compendiously reformulated as "For some audience A, U intended his utterance of x to produce in A some effect (response) E, by means of A's recognition of that intention." As I wish to continue to use the central idea of this definition, I shall introduce an abbreviation: "U intends to produce in A effect E by

means of A's recognition of that intention" is abbreviated to "U M-intends to produce in A effect E" ("M" is for "meaning").

The point of divergence between my current and my earlier accounts lies in the characterization of the M-intended effect (response). In the earlier account I took the view that the M-intended effect is, in the case of indicative-type utterances, that the hearer should *believe* something, and, in the case of imperative-type utterances, that the hearer should *do* something. I wish for present purposes to make two changes here.

(1) I wish to represent the M-intended effect of imperative-type utterances as being that the hearer should *intend* to do something (with of course the ulterior intention on the part of the utterer that the hearer should go on to do the act in question).

(2) I wish to regard the M-intended effect common to indicative-type utterances as being, not that the hearer should believe something (though there is frequently an ulterior intention to that effect), but that the hearer should *think that the utterer believes* something.

The effect of the first change will be that the way is opened to a simplified treatment of the M-intended effect, as being always the generation of some propositional attitude. The effect of the second change (made in order to unify the treatment of indicative-type utterances, some of which are, and some of which are not, cases of informing or telling) will be to introduce a distinction between what I might call *exhibitive* utterances (utterances by which the utterer U M-intends to impart a belief that he (U) has a certain propositional attitude) and utterances which are not only exhibitive but also what I might call *protreptic* (utterances by which U M-intends, *via* imparting a belief that he (U) has a certain propositional attitude, to induce a corresponding attitude in the hearer).

I shall now try to reformulate the account in a generalized form. Let "A" range over audiences or hearers. Let the device " $\ast_{\psi}$ " (read "asterisk-sub- $\psi$ ") be a dummy, which represents a specific mood-indicator which corresponds to the propositional attitude  $\psi$ -ing (whichever that may be), as, for example, " $\ast_{\ast}$ " corresponds to believing (thinking) and " $\ast_{!}$ " corresponds to intending. I can, using this device, offer the following rough definition:

D1: "By (when) uttering x U meant that  $\ast_{\psi} p$ " = df. "( $\exists$ A) (U uttered x M-intending [i] that A should think U to  $\psi$  that p and [in some cases only, depending on the identification of  $\ast_{\psi} p$ ] (ii) that A should, via the fulfillment of [i], himself  $\psi$  that p)."

It is convenient to have an abbreviated version of this definiens. Let the device " $\psi^t$ " (read " $\psi$ -dagger") be a dummy which operates as follows: in some cases the phrase "that A should  $\psi$  that p" is to be interpreted as "that A should think  $\psi$  to  $\psi$  that p"; in other cases this phrase is to be interpreted as "that A should  $\psi$  that p (via thinking  $\psi$  to  $\psi$  that p)." Which interpretation is to be selected is determined by the specification of " $\ast, \psi$ ." We may now reformulate D1 as follows:

D1': "By (when) uttering x, U meant that  $\ast, \psi$ " = df. " $(\exists A)$  (U uttered x M-intending that A should  $\psi^t$  that p)."

To meet all the difficulties to which my earlier account (which was only intended as a model) is exposed, a very much more complicated definition is required. But as the examples which force the introduction of this complexity involve relatively sophisticated kinds of communication or linguistic performances, I hope that, for working purposes, the proffered definition will be adequate.

Stage III. Step (1): timeless meaning for unstructured utterance-types.

It is, I think, extremely important to distinguish two problems:

- (1) What is the relation between timeless meaning (for complete utterance-types) and occasion-meaning?
- (2) In the case of syntactically structured (linguistic) utterance-types, how is the timeless meaning of a complete (sentential) utterance-type related to the timeless meanings of its noncomplete structured and unstructured elements (approximately, phrases and words), and what account is to be given of timeless meaning for noncomplete utterance-types?

If we do not treat these problems separately, we shall have only ourselves to blame for the confusion in which we shall find ourselves. So initially I shall restrict myself to examining the notion of timeless meaning in its application to unstructured utterance-types. My main example will be a gesture (a signal), and it will be convenient first to consider the idea of its timeless meaning for an individual (within a signaling idiolect, so to speak), and only afterward to consider the extension of this idea to groups of individuals. We shall thus preserve for the time being the possibility of keeping distinct the ideas of having an *established* meaning and of having a *conventional* meaning.

Suppose that a particular sort of hand wave (to be referred to as

"HW") for a particular individual U (within U's idiolect) means "I know the route." We are to look for an explication of the sentence "For U, HW means 'I know the route'" which will relate timeless meaning to occasion-meaning. As a first shot, one might suggest something like "It is U's policy (practice, habit) to utter HW in order to mean that U knows the route" (where "mean that" is to be analyzed in accordance with D1); or more perspicuously, "It is U's policy (practice, habit) to utter HW if U is making an utterance by which U means that U knows the route."

If we apply D1 to this suggested definiens, we shall get the following expanded definiens: "It is U's policy (practice, habit) to utter HW if U is making an utterance by means of which (for some A) U M-intends to effect that A thinks U to think that U knows the route." Now, whether or not this definiens is otherwise acceptable, I wish to argue that the notion of M-intention is otiose here, and that only the notion of simple intention need be invoked; if U's policy (practice, habit) is such that his use of HW is tied to the presence of a *simple* intention to affect an audience in the way described, it will follow that when, on a given occasion, he utters HW, he will do so, on that occasion, M-intending to affect his audience in that way.

Suppose that, using only the notion of simple intention, we specify U's policy as follows: "I (that is, utterer U) shall utter HW if I intend (want) some A to think that I think I know the route." Now, if U is ever to have the particular intentions which will be involved in every implementation of this policy, he must (logically) be in a position, when uttering HW, to suppose that there is at least some chance that these intentions will be realized; for such a supposition to be justified, as U well knows, a given audience A must be aware of U's policy and must suppose it to apply to the utterance of HW with which U has presented him. U, then, when uttering HW on a particular occasion, must expect A to think (or at least to be in a position to think) as follows: "U's policy for HW is such that he utters HW now with the intention that I should think that he thinks that he knows the route; in that case, I take it that he does think that he knows the route." But to utter HW expecting A to respond in such a way is to utter HW M-intending that A should think that U thinks that U knows the route. So a formulation of U's policy of HW in terms of the notion of simple intention is adequate to ensure that, by a particular utterance of HW, U will mean that he knows the route.

We may, then, suggest a simplified definition: "For U, HW means

"I know the route" = df. "It is U's policy (practice, habit) to utter HW if, for some A, U intends (wants) A to think that U thinks U knows the route." This definition, however, is doubly unacceptable. (1) For U, HW may have a second meaning; it may also mean "I am about to leave you." If that is so, U's policy (etc.) cannot be to utter HW only if U wants some A to think that U thinks U knows the route; sometimes he will be ready to utter HW wanting some A to think that U thinks that U is about to leave A. (2) U may have other ways of getting an A to think that U thinks that U knows the route (such as saying "I know the route") and may be ready, on occasion, to employ them. That being so, U's policy (etc.) cannot be to utter HW if (i.e. whenever) U wants A to think that U thinks U knows the route.

To cope with these difficulties, I think I need some such idea as that of "having a certain procedure in one's repertoire." This idea seems to me to be intuitively fairly intelligible and to have application outside the realm of linguistic, or otherwise communicative, performances, though it could hardly be denied that it requires further explanation. A faintly eccentric lecturer might have in his repertoire the following procedure: if he sees an attractive girl in his audience, to pause for half a minute and then take a sedative. His having in his repertoire this procedure would not be incompatible with his also having two further procedures: (a) if he sees an attractive girl, to put on a pair of dark spectacles (instead of pausing and taking a sedative); (b) to pause and take a sedative when he sees in his audience not an attractive girl, but a particularly distinguished colleague. Somewhat similarly, if U has in his repertoire the procedure of uttering HW if he wants an audience A to think U thinks U knows the route, this fact would not be incompatible with his having at least two further procedures: (1) to say "I know the route" if he wants some A to think U thinks U knows the route, and (2) to utter HW if U wants some A to think U thinks he is about to leave A. So I propose the definition:

D2: "For U utterance-type X means (has as one of its meanings) 'A to P' = df. "U has in his repertoire the following procedure: to utter a token of X if U intends (wants) A to  $\psi$  that p."

We may now turn from the idea of timeless meaning within an idiolect to that of timeless meaning for a group or class of individuals. If U utters HW, his measure of expectation of success as regards effecting the intended response obviously depends (as has already been remarked) on A's knowledge of U's procedure; and normally, unless

the signal is to be explained to each A, on A's repertoire containing the same procedure. So obviously each member of some group G (within which HW is to be a tool of communication) will want his procedure with respect to HW to conform to the general practice of the group. So I suggest the following rough definition:

D3: "For group G, utterance-type X means 'A to P' = df. "At least some (many) members of group G have in their repertoires the procedure of uttering a token of X if, for some A, they want A to  $\psi$  that P, the retention of this procedure being for them conditional on the assumption that at least some (other) members of G have, or have had, this procedure in their repertoires."

D3 gets in the idea of aiming at conformity and so perhaps (derivatively) also that of *correct* and *incorrect* use of X, as distinct from the idea merely of usual or unusual use of X.

The explication of the notion of "having a procedure in one's repertoire" is, to my mind, a task of considerable difficulty. I have felt inclined to propose, as a makeshift definition, the following:

"U has in his repertoire the procedure of ..." = df. "U has a standing readiness (willingness, preparedness), in some degree, to ..." a readiness (etc.) to do something being a member of the same family (a weaker brother, so to speak) as an intention to do that thing.

But this definition would clearly be inadequate as it stands. It may well be true that, for my exceedingly prim Aunt Matilda, the expression "he is a runt" means "he is an undersized person," and yet quite false that she has any degree of readiness to utter the expression in any circumstances whatsoever. What one seems to need is the idea of her being *equipped* to use the expression, and the analysis of *this* idea is also problematic.

So for the present I shall abandon the attempt to provide a definition, and content myself with a few informal remarks. There seem to me to be three main types of case in which one may legitimately speak of an established procedure in respect of utterance-type X:

(1) That in which X is current for some group G; that is to say, to utter X in such-and-such circumstances is part of the practice of many members of G. In that case my Aunt Matilda (a member of G) may be said to have a procedure for X, even though she herself would rather be seen dead than utter X, for she knows that some other mem-

the utterance of HW will be based on its knowledge that U has a certain procedure (to utter HW if U wants an audience to think that U thinks U knows the route).

Stages III and IV. Step (2): timeless and applied timeless meaning for structured utterance-types, complete and noncomplete.

To deal with structured utterance-types and their elements, I think I need the following apparatus.

(1) Let " $S_1(S_2)$ " (read " $S_1$ -with- $S_2$ ") denote a sentence of which  $S_2$  is a subsentence. Allow that a sentence is a subsentence of itself, so that  $S_1$  may =  $S_1$ .

(2) Let  $v[S_1(S_2)]$  (read " $v$ -of- $S_1$ -with- $S_2$ ") be a particular utterance (token) of  $S_1(S_2)$  uttered by U.  $v[S_1(S_2)]$  is to be a *complete* utterance; that is, it is not to be part of  $v[S_3(S_1(S_2))]$  (not, for example, to be the utterance of a disjunct within the utterance of a disjunction).

(3) It is a characteristic of sentences (a characteristic shared with phrases) that their standard meaning is consequential upon the meaning of the elements (words, lexical items) which enter into them. So I need the notion of a "resultant procedure": as a first approximation, one might say that a procedure for an utterance-type X is a resultant procedure if it is determined by (its existence is inferrable from) a knowledge of procedures (1) for particular utterance-types which are elements in X, and (2) for any sequence of utterance-types which exemplifies a particular ordering of syntactical categories (a particular syntactical form).

Now let us deal with the notion of timeless meaning in U's idiolect:

D5: "For U, S means ' ${}_0p$ '" = df. "U has a resultant procedure for S, namely to utter S if, for some A, U wants A to  $\psi$  that p" (D5 parallels D2).

An explication of timeless meaning in a language can, perhaps, be provided by adapting D3, but I shall not attempt this task now.  
For applied timeless meaning I offer:

D6: " $S_2$  in  $v[S_1(S_2)]$  meant ' ${}_0p$ '" = df. " $(\exists A) (\exists q) (U$  meant by  $v[S_1(S_2)]$  that ' $q$ , and U intended A to recognize that U meant by  $v[S_1(S_2)]$  that ' $q$  at least partly on the basis of A's thought that U has a resultant procedure for  $S_2$ , namely (for suitable A') to utter  $S_2$  if U wants A' to  $\psi$  that p)" (D6 parallels D4').

bers of G do have a readiness to utter X in such-and-such circumstances.

(2) That in which X is current only for U; it is only U's practice to utter X in such-and-such circumstances. In this case U *will* have a readiness to utter X in such-and-such circumstances.

(3) That in which X is not current at all, but the utterance of X in such-and-such circumstances is part of some system of communication which U has devised but which has never been put into operation (like the new highway code which I invent one day while lying in my bath). In that case U has a procedure for X in the attenuated sense that he has envisaged a possible system of practices which *would* involve a readiness to utter X in such-and-such circumstances.

Stage IV. Step (1): applied timeless meaning for unstructured utterance-types.

We are now in a position to define a notion of applied timeless meaning which will apply to HW:

D4: "When U uttered X (type), X meant ' ${}_0p$ '" = df. " $(\exists A) (U$  intended A to recognize  $\{?$  and to recognize that U intended A to recognize) what U meant [occasion-meaning] by his uttering X, on the basis of A's knowledge [assumption] that, for U, X means [has as one of its meanings] ' ${}_0p$ ' [as defined by D2]."

Or it can be more fully defined (let " $+$ " and " $o$ " both be dummy mood-indicators):

D4': "When U uttered X, X meant ' ${}_0p$ '" = df. " $(\exists A) (\exists q) (U$  meant by uttering X that ' $q$ ; and U intended A to recognize  $\{?$  and to recognize that he was intended to recognize) that, by uttering X, U meant that ' $q$  *via* A's knowledge [assumption] that in U's repertoire is the procedure of uttering X if, for some A', U wants A' to  $\psi$  that p)" [" $p$ " may, or may not, represent that propositional content to which indefinite reference is made in the existential quantification of " $q$ "].

D4 and of course D4' allow both for the case in which U meant by HW *that* he knew the route (coincidence of meaning "...") and meaning *that* ..., and also for the case in which, for example, U (a criminal) has lured a victim into his car and signals (non-literally, so to speak) to his accomplice that he knows how to handle the victim. In both cases it is expected by U that the audience's understanding of

So far (maybe) so good. But the notion of "resultant procedure" has been left pretty unilluminated, and if we are to shed any light on the notion of word meaning, and its connection with "meaning that," we ought to look at the nature of the more fundamental procedures from which a resultant procedure descends. It would be nice to give a general schema, to show the role of word meanings (covering every type of word) in determining (in combination) sentence meanings (covering sentences of any syntactical structure). But this looks like a Herculean task (in our present state of knowledge). The best we can hope for is a sketch, for a very restricted (but central) range of word types and syntactical forms, of a fragment of what might be the kind of theory we need. Let us take as our range all or part of the range of affirmative categorical (not necessarily indicative) sentences involving a noun (or definite description) and an adjective (or adjectival phrase).

The apparatus needed (for one such attempt) would be:

(1) Suppose  $\sigma$  to be an indicative sentence. Then we need to be able to apply the ideas of an indicative version of  $\sigma$  ( $\sigma$  itself), an imperative version of  $\sigma$ , an optative version of  $\sigma$ , etc. (mood variations). It would be the business of some linguistic theory to equip us to apply such characterizations (so as philosophers of language we can assume this as given).

(2) We need to be able to apply some such notion as a predication of  $\beta$  (adjectival) on  $\alpha$  (nominal). "Smith is tactful," "Smith, be tactful," "Let Smith be tactful," and "Oh, that Smith may be tactful" would be required to count, all of them, as predications of "tactful" on "Smith." It would again be the business of some linguistic theory to set up such a sentential characterization.

(3) Suppose we, for a moment, take for granted two species of correlation, R-correlation (referential) and D-correlation (denotational). We want to be able to speak of some particular object as an R-correlate of  $\alpha$  (nominal), and of each member of some class as being a D-correlate of  $\beta$  (adjectival).

Now suppose that U has the following two procedures (P):

P1: To utter the indicative version of  $\sigma$  if (for some A) U wants/ intends A to think that U thinks ... (the blank being filled by the infinitive version of  $\sigma$ , e.g. "Smith to be tactful"). Also, P1: obtained from P1 by substituting "imperative"/"indicative" and "intend"/"think that U thinks." (Such procedures set up correlations between moods and specifications of " $\psi$ ".)

P2: To utter a  $\psi$ -correlated (cf. P1 and P1') predication of  $\beta$  on  $\alpha$  if (for some A) U wants A to  $\psi$  a particular R-correlate of  $\alpha$  to be one of a particular set of D-correlates of  $\beta$ .

Further suppose that, for U, the following two correlations hold:

C1: Jones's dog is an R-correlate of "Fido."

C2: Any hairy-coated thing is a D-correlate of "shaggy."

Given that U has the initial procedures P1 and P2, we can infer that U has the resultant procedure (determined by P1 and P2):

RP1: to utter the indicative version of a predication of  $\beta$  on  $\alpha$  if U wants A to think U to think a particular R-correlate of  $\alpha$  to be one of a particular set of D-correlates of  $\beta$ .

Given RP1 and C1, we can infer that U has:

RP2: To utter the indicative version of a predication of  $\beta$  on "Fido" if U wants A to think U to think Jones's dog to be one of a particular set of D-correlates of  $\beta$ .

Given RP2 and C2, we can infer that U has:

RP3: To utter the indicative version of a predication of "shaggy" on "Fido" if U wants A to think U to think Jones's dog is one of the set of hairy-coated things (i.e. is hairy-coated).

And given the information from the linguist that "Fido is shaggy" is the indicative version of a predication of "shaggy" on "Fido" (assumed), we can infer U to have:

RP4: To utter "Fido is shaggy" if U wants A to think U to think that Jones's dog is hairy-coated. And RP4 is an interpretant of "For U, 'Fido is shaggy' means 'Jones's dog is hairy-coated'."

I have not yet provided an explication for statements of timeless meaning relating to noncomplete utterance-types. I am not in a position to provide a definitives for "X (noncomplete) means ..." Indeed, I am not certain that a general form of definition can be provided for this schema; it may remain impossible to provide a definitives until the syntactical category of X has been given. I can, however, provide a definitives which may be adequate for adjectival X (e.g. "shaggy"):

D7: "For U, X (adjectival) means '...' " = df. "U has this procedure: to utter a  $\psi$ -correlated predication of X on  $\alpha$  if (for some A) U wants A to  $\psi$  a particular R-correlate of  $\alpha$  to be ..." (where the two lacunae represented by dots are identically completed).

Any specific procedure of the form mentioned in the definiens of D7 can be shown to be a *resultant* procedure. For example, if U has P2 and also C2, it is inferable that he has the procedure of uttering a  $\psi$ -correlated predication of "shaggy" on  $\alpha$  if (for some A) U wants A to  $\psi$  a particular R-correlate of  $\alpha$  to be one of the set of hairy-coated things, that is, that for U "shaggy" means "hairy-coated."

I can now offer a definition of the notion of a *complete* utterance-type which has so far been taken for granted:

D8: "X is complete" =df. "A fully expanded definiens for 'X' means '...' contains no explicit reference to correlation, other than that involved in speaking of an R-correlate of some referring expression occurring within X." (The expanded definiens for the complete utterance-type "He is shaggy" may be expected to contain the phrase "a particular R-correlate of 'he.'")

*Correlation.* We must now stop taking for granted the notion of correlation. What does it mean to say that, for example, Jones's dog is the (an R-correlate of "Fido")? One idea (building in as little as possible) would be to think of "Fido" and Jones's dog as paired, in some system of pairing in which names and objects form ordered pairs. But in one sense of "pair," any one name and any one object form a pair (an ordered pair, the first member of which is the name, the second the object). We want a sense of "paired" in which "Fido" is paired with Jones's dog but not with Smith's cat. "Selected pair"? But what does "selected" mean? Not "selected" in the sense in which an apple and an orange may be selected from a dish: perhaps in the sense in which a dog may be selected (as something with which [to which] the selector intends to do something). But in the case of the word-thing pair, do what? And what is the process of selecting?

I suggest we consider initially the special case in which linguistic and nonlinguistic items are *explicitly* correlated. Let us take this to consist in performing some act as a result of which a linguistic item and a nonlinguistic item (or items) come to stand in a relation in which they did not previously stand, and in which neither stands to noncorrelates in the other realm. Since the act of correlation *may* be a verbal act, how can this set up a relation between items?

Suppose U produces a particular utterance (token) V, which belongs to the utterance-type "shaggy: hairy-coated things." To be able to say that U had by V correlated "shaggy" with each member of the set of hairy-coated things, we should need to be able to say that there

is some relation R such that: (a) by uttering V, U effected that "shaggy" stood in R to each hairy-coated thing, and only to hairy-coated things; (b) uttered V in order that, by uttering V he should effect this. It is clear that condition (b), on which some will look askance because it introduces a reference to U's *intention* in performing his act of correlation, is required, and that condition (a) alone would be inadequate. Certainly by uttering V, regardless of his intentions, U has set up a situation in which a relation R holds exclusively between "shaggy" and each hairy-coated thing Z, namely the relation which consists in being an expression uttered by U on a particular occasion O in conversational juxtaposition with the name of a class to which Z belongs. But by the same act, U has also set up a situation in which another relation R' holds exclusively between "shaggy" and each non-hairy-coated thing Z', namely the relation which consists in being an expression uttered by U on occasion O in conversational juxtaposition with the name of the *complement* of a class to which Z' belongs. We do not, however, for our purposes, wish to think of U as having correlated "shaggy" with each non-hairy-coated thing. The only way to ensure that R' is eliminated is to add condition (b), which confines attention to a relationship which U *intends* to set up. It looks as if intentionality is embedded in the very foundations of the theory of language.

Let us, then, express more formally the proposed account of correlation. Suppose that V = utterance-token of type "Shaggy": hairy-coated things" (written). Then, by uttering V, U has correlated "shaggy" with (and only with) each hairy-coated thing = (ER) {U effected by V that [Vx] [R "shaggy" x=xEy (y is a hairy-coated thing)]} and (U uttered V in order that U effect by V that [Vx] . . . ).

If so understood, U will have correlated "shaggy" with hairy-

1. The definiens suggested for explicit correlation is, I think, insufficient as it stands. I would not wish to say that if A deliberately detaches B from a party, he has thereby correlated himself with B, nor that a lecturer who ensures that just one blackboard is visible to each member of his audience (and to no one else) has thereby explicitly correlated the blackboard with each member of the audience, even though in each case the analogue of the suggested definiens is satisfied. To have explicitly correlated X with each member of a set K, not only must I have intentionally effected that a particular relation R holds between X and all those (and only those) items which belong to K, but also my purpose or end in setting up this relationship must have been to perform an act as a result of which *there will be some relation or other* which holds between X and all these (and only these) things which belong to K. To the definiens, then, we should add, within the scope of the initial quantifier, the following clause: "& U's purpose in effecting that  $\forall x$  (.....) is that: (ER) (Vz) [R' 'shaggy' z=zEy (y is hairy-coated)]."

coated things only if there is an identifiable R' for which the condition specified in the definiens holds. What is such an R'? I suggest R'xy ≡ x is a (word) type such that V is a sequence consisting of a token of x followed by a colon followed by an expression ("hairy-coated things") the R-correlate of which is a set of which y is a member. R'xy holds between "shaggy" and each hairy-coated thing given U's utterance of V. Any utterance V' of the form exemplified by V could be uttered to set up R'xy (involving V' instead of V) between any expression and each member of any set of nonlinguistic items.

There are other ways of achieving the same effect. The purpose of making the utterance can be specified in the utterance: V = utterance of "To effect that, for some R, 'shaggy' has R only to each hairy-coated thing, 'shaggy': hairy-coated things." The expression of the specified R will now have "V is a sequence containing" instead of "V is a sequence consisting of . . ." Or U can use the performative form: "I correlate 'shaggy' with each hairy-coated thing." Utterance of this form will at the same time set up the required relation and label itself as being uttered with the purpose of setting up such a relation.

But by whichever form an act of explicit correlation is effected, to say of it that it is (or is intended to be) an act of correlation is always to make an indefinite reference to a relationship which the act is intended to set up, and the specification of the relation involved in turn always involves a further use of the notion of correlation (e.g. as above in speaking of a set which is the correlate [R-correlate] of a particular expression [e.g. "Hairy-coated things"]). This seems to involve a regress which might well be objectionable; though "correlation" is not used in definition of correlation, it is used in specification of an indefinite reference occurring in the definition of correlation. It might be considered desirable (even necessary) to find a way of stopping this regress at some stage. (Is this a characteristically *empiricist* demand?) If we don't stop it, can correlation even get started (if prior correlation is presupposed)? Let us try "ostensive" correlation. In an attempted ostensive correlation of the word "shaggy" with the property of hairy-coatedness:

- (1) U will perform a number of acts in each of which he ostends an object ( $a_1, a_2, a_3$ , etc.).
- (2) Simultaneously with each ostension he utters a token of the word "shaggy."
- (3) It is his intention to ostend, and to be recognized as ostending,

only objects which are either, in his view, plainly hairy-coated or are, in his view, plainly not hairy-coated.

(4) In a model sequence these intentions are fulfilled. For a model sequence to succeed in correlating the word "shaggy" with the property of being hairy-coated, it seems necessary (and perhaps also sufficient) that there should be some relation R which holds between the word "shaggy" and each hairy-coated thing,  $y$ ; just in case  $y$  is hairy-coated. Can such a relation R be specified? Perhaps at least in a sequence of model cases, in which U's linguistic intentions are rewarded by success, it can; the relation between the word "shaggy" and each hairy-coated object  $y$  would be the relation which holds between each plainly hairy-coated object  $y$  and the word "shaggy" and which consists in the fact that  $y$  is a thing to which U does and would apply, rather than refuse to apply, the word "shaggy." In other words in a limited universe consisting of things which in U's view are either plainly hairy-coated or plainly not hairy-coated, the relation R holds only between the word "shaggy" and each object which is for U plainly hairy-coated.

This suggestion seems not without its difficulties:

(1) It looks as if we should want to distinguish between two relations R and R'; we want U to set up a relation R which holds between the word "shaggy" and each hairy-coated object; but the preceding account seems not to distinguish between this relation and a relation R' which holds between the word "shaggy" and each object which is in U's view unmistakably hairy-coated. To put it another way, how is U to distinguish between "shaggy" (which means hairy-coated) and the word "shaggy" (which means "in U's view unmistakably hairy-coated")?

(2) If in an attempt to evade these troubles we suppose the relation R to be one which holds between the word "shaggy" and each object to which U would in certain circumstances apply the word "shaggy," how do we specify the circumstances in question? If we suggest that the circumstances are those in which U is concerned to set up an explicit correlation between the word "shaggy" and each member of an appropriate set of objects, our proposal becomes at once unrealistic and problematic. Normally correlations seem to grow rather than to be created, and attempts to connect such growth with potentialities of creation may give rise to further threats of circularity. The situation seems to be as follows:

(1) We need to be able to invoke such a resultant procedure as the following, which we will call RP12, namely to predicate  $\beta$  on "Fido," when U wants A to  $\beta$ : that Jones's dog is a D-correlate of  $\beta$ ; and we want to be able to say that at least sometimes such a resultant procedure may result from among other things, a nonexplicit R-correlation of "Fido" and Jones's dog.

(2) It is tempting to suggest that a nonexplicit R-correlation of "Fido" and Jones's dog consists in the fact that U *would*, explicitly, correlate "Fido" and Jones's dog.

(3) But to say that U would explicitly correlate "Fido" and Jones's dog must be understood as an elliptical way of saying something of the form "U would explicitly correlate 'Fido' and Jones's dog, *if p*." How is "*if p*" to be specified?

(4) Perhaps as "If U were asked to give an explicit correlation for 'Fido.'" But if U were actually faced with a request, he might well take it that he is being asked to make a stipulation, in the making of which he would have an entirely free hand. If he is not being asked for a stipulation, then it must be imparted to him that his explicit correlation is to satisfy some nonarbitrary condition. But what condition can this be? Again it is tempting to suggest that he is to make his explicit correlation such as to match or fit existing procedures.

(5) In application to RP12, this seems to amount to imposing on U the demand that he should make his explicit correlation such as to yield RP12.

(6) In that case, RP12 results from a nonexplicit correlation which consists in the fact that U *would* explicitly correlate "Fido" and Jones's dog if he wanted to make an explicit correlation which would generate relevant existing procedures, namely RP12 itself. There is an apparent circularity here. Is this tolerable?

(7) It may be tolerable inasmuch as it may be a special case of a general phenomenon which arises in connection with the explanation of linguistic practice. We can, if we are lucky, identify "linguistic rules," so called, which are such that our linguistic practice is *as if* we accepted these rules and consciously followed them. But we want to say that this is not just an interesting fact about our linguistic practice but also an explanation of it; and this leads us on to suppose that "in some sense," "implicitly," we *do* accept these rules. Now the proper interpretation of the idea that we *do* accept these rules becomes something of a mystery, if the "acceptance" of the rules is to be distinguished from the existence of the related practices—but it seems like

a mystery which, for the time being at least, we have to swallow, while recognizing that it involves us in an as yet unsolved problem.

### C. Concluding Note

It will hardly have escaped notice that my account of the cluster of notions connected with the term "meaning" has been studded with expressions for such intensional concepts as those of intending and believing, and my partial excursions into symbolic notation have been made partly with the idea of revealing my commitment to the legitimacy of quantifying over such items as propositions. I shall make two highly general remarks about this aspect of my procedure. First, I am not sympathetic toward any methodological policy which would restrict one from the start to an attempt to formulate a theory of meaning in extensional terms. It seems to me that one should at least start by giving oneself a free hand to make use of any intensional notions or devices which seem to be required in order to solve one's conceptual problems, at least at a certain level, in ways which (metaphysical bias apart) reason and intuition commend. If one deutes oneself this freedom, one runs a serious risk of underestimating the richness and complexity of the conceptual field which one is investigating.

Second, I said at one point that intensionality seems to be embedded in the very foundations of the theory of language. Even if this appearance corresponds with reality, one is not, I suspect, precluded from being, in at least one important sense, an extensionalist. The psychological concepts which, in my view, are needed for the formulation of an adequate theory of language may not be among the most primitive or fundamental psychological concepts (like those which apply not only to human beings but also to quite lowly animals), and it may be possible to derive (in *some* relevant sense of "derive") the intensional concepts which I have been using from more primitive extensional concepts. Any extensionalist has to deal with the problem of allowing for a transition from an extensional to a nonextensional language; and it is by no means obvious to me that intensionality can be explained only via the idea of concealed references to language and so presupposes the concepts in terms of which the use of language has to be understood.